

The Eastern Tropical Pacific Tuna Purse Seine fishery

Exploring new directions

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Key messages

- RFMOs may not be the most effective instrument for allocation and control of rights among individual fishers (as opposed to states)
- Other complementary instruments and arrangements may be required

Focus

- Alternatives
 - Rights.... not buyback
 - ‘sustainable’ buybacks require secure rights
- Combined EEZs as key unit not HS
- Segments
 - Purse seine
 - Longline
 - Local coastal small scale (and P&L)
- Establish boundaries for the rights discussion

Assumptions

- A high proportion of the PS catch is within the EEZs
- It is unprofitable for PS vessels to fish only on the HS
- Coastal states by themselves have the 'power' to structure an efficient and effective rights-based regime
 - distant water fishing not a primary consideration

Role of IATTC

- Strengths:
 - Scientific advice
 - Agreement on TACs,
 - limits: dolphin (and bigeye?)
 - Technical measures
- Less strong
 - Vessel/ capacity limits
 - Efficient allocation of quotas/ limits
 - control and penalty determination/ application

Nature of rights

- Current – vessel capacity & dolphin
- Move to
 - Quantity of fish (% of TAC) and
 - Limits – dolphin, YF and bigeye (?)
- Allocation – 2 levels
 - State
 - Fisher

Architecture

IATTC

(political/ ecological)

- Overall TACs and limits
- Allocation between states
- ? Independent verification/ control

TunaCorp

A Corporate Instrument?

(economic)

- States as shareholders in TunaCorp
- States pool quotas, or part of quotas/ limits
- States pool EEZs/ licensing
- Fishers pay for quotas
- TunaCorp manages, finances control, research
- Acts as 'firewall'

Architecture 2

- Unitary rights trading architecture
- Not set of aligned national regimes (e.g. EC)
- Vessels to operate freely in all EEZs (conditional ceding of licensing authority)
- Independent catch control / verification – level playing field and transparency e.g. SGS
- Internalize management costs
- All coastal states, or fast-track of lead group?

Initial allocation

- State level
 - Formula based on current / historical record – negotiated
- Fisher level
 - Each state allocates as it sees fit – year 1
 - Denominated in terms of TunaCorp trading units (YF, dolphin, etc)
 - Year 2+ fishers can trade through TunaCorp
- TunaCorp allocated % of TAC from Year 2- fishers bid for TunaCorp TAC
- States could request TunaCorp to auction their quota (market could be open to all members, or restricted to that States' fishers?)

conclusions

- A rights regime requires clear boundaries (fishery, area, participants)
- It may be necessary to explore arrangements outside conventional RFMO roles
- Extending the role of IATTC to manage a rights-based regime at fisher level may not be effective
- A corporate type instrument such as TunaCorp may be required
- Workshop participants are invited to explore all options