RBFM Objectives

- Tuna management needs global solutions no more open horizons in EEZs or on the HS
 - # Obj. 1 is the long term sustainability of the world tuna fisheries
 - Need to align incentives of fishers, management authorities and communities to achieve sustainability and increased resource rents
 - Industry to work closely with government on this
- Implicit in current situation:
 - + ve: Stock sustainability at the heart of the objectives and level at which stocks sustained should be economically sustainable (Bmsy >Bmey)
 - -ve: States expect to retain ownership, decide on own specific objectives but this will act against the flexibility needed in fisheries management systems and trading to align public and private rights across the fisheries
 - Issue of rights allocations to states needs resolution before going to allocations to individuals/companies
 - State aspirations and differences can complicate the trading and achievements of objectives
- Removing the constraints
 - Need to make the case for RBFM with an economic proposition
 - May need neutral 3rd party, eg. WB, to help remove constraints, e.g, political, fishing capacity, funds to act, to achieve rights based system
 - 3rd party advantage characteristics sought: reputation for objectivity/integrity, ability to help overcome conflicts of interest, knowledge of development solutions (eg., phased projects), financial instruments and ability to command financial accountability from countries, RFMOs
 - Need a pot of money to enable transition to RBFM
 - RFMOs are entry point for RBFM, have the tools for surveys, etc
 - Can't move ahead unless have limited entry/exclusivity first at RFMO level

Limited Entry

- LE schemes are 1st management step principle that need exclusivity first for the tuna fisheries (mixed eez, hs fisheries) need to close the shop somehow
 - Useful in achieving the environment in which can align incentives, work together for sustainability
 - Caveat: would not need LE if go straight to quota, but this is not likely, so LE will be a useful
 intermediate step in the transition period, and will be important if a buyback is planned
 - Need to define and continue to reduce fishing capacity
 - Overcapacity puts pressure on states/RFMOs to allow overfishing
 - But unlikely to achieve resource sustainability and profitability if input and capacity controls are the only tools
 - LE creates an imperfect right; no link w catch; doesn't deal w input substitution, tech innovation
 - Difficult to deal w changes in mix of fishing methods (LL,PS, etc) and their variants (PS-FADs, PS-Dolphin etc) affected by internal and external management drivers
 - Have to deal w transferability issues
 - Status quo (history in fishery) as starting point
- Current situation on LE in world tuna fisheries
 - Entry is not yet as limited as it needs to be
 - IATTC ahead of the other tuna RFMOs on LE but needs improvement
 - IATTC-LE may be good enough to proceed to new RBFM for EPO
 - Others have more work to do to achieve effective LE schemes <see later discussion on WCP-VDS>
- Closing the shop: WRT legal interpretations from UNCLOS, UNFSA and the RFMO instruments, need methods for handling (time bound and open) capacity options (a form of rights) of coastal developing states, conditioned on present state of tuna fisheries development; and plans of DWF states
 - How to convince the coastal states to relinquish the rights to participate in the fishery to achieve other goals; use- it lose it rules out options of ngos buying out rights;

Incentive-based Approaches

- Aligning public and private incentives for fisheries resource and environmental conservation
 - Increasing number of positive examples
 - E.g., IATTC DMLs tradeable property rights system
 - Good enforcement also a key to rights schemes

WCP Vessel Day Scheme

- Workshop noted development of the WCP VDS. Not clear how scheme would:
 - Improve stock conservation as does not incorporate incentives to reduce catch
 - Encourage making the best use of stocks
- EPO and WCP tuna fisheries are linked through some regional overlap and some common fleets
 - VDS needs further investigation to understand objectives, operations

Program

- Wed AM
 - Review summary points
 - Group rights
 - ITQs in tuna fisheries
- Wed PM
 - Buyback of vessels or fishing rights
- Thurs AM:
 - Mechanics of monitoring, control, surveillance
 - Further work, report summary, dissemination

Follow up actions

- Table of current LE provisions in tuna RFMOs
- Economic case for RBFM
- Political feasibility analysis